Nearly two centuries ago, Prussian military thinker Carl von Clausewitz set out the rules of modern military engagement. The attacking force, Clausewitz stipulated, must outnumber the defending force by  three to one. Why? In order to outweigh the three advantages of the defenders: control of the terrain; established defenses; and intimate knowledge of the area. Time and time again, the brilliance of these Prussian rules of combat has been demonstrated - and now it is becoming evident that they also apply to the current engagement in Lebanon.

Israel has the ability to win the war against Hizbullah, and to win it easily. Its ground forces outnumber the Hizbullah's forces dozens of times more than Clausewitz's law. Plus Israel's ability to sustain them in the field is hundreds of times higher than the Hizbullah fighters' ability to hold out. The problem is, as usual, a concept: the concept that the battle can be won without the use of major ground forces. Instead, Israel has based its campaign almost solely on attacks from the air, artillery barrages, and small commando-like attacks on the enemy's strongholds. However, tactics like these have failed time and time again.

Finally, as the war enters its third week, the Israeli authorities are regaining their senses and returning to the basics. If Israel wants to win this thing, it must put major ground forces into southern Lebanon, not in order to stay there, but in order to search out and destroy the caches of rockets and the forces that operate them.

Israel is finally mobilizing the ground forces that it needs to finish this engagement. It will take a few days to get them ready; towards the end of next week, they should be in the field. It then will take a couple of weeks for them to clean up southern Lebanon and put an end to the rocket fire emanating from it. The question that we, the Israelis, must demand an answer to is why we had to bear three weeks of Katusha attacks - three weeks that one million Israelis spent in bunkers or living as refugees, camped out at the homes of relatives and friends.

Hizbullah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah already has lost his war. His forces have been depleted, his hold on Lebanon has declined. When all this is over, the Lebanese will ask why was this necessary and Nasrallah's Iranian overlords will demand explanations for his misreading of Israel's reaction. But, next time Israel is forced to go to war, let's remember to stick to the basics: carry a big stick and, when necessary, use it efficiently.