IDF Chief of General Staff Lt.-Gen. Dan Halutz, has been hospitalized twice in the last three days for acute stomachaches. Nothing serious is wrong, he simply has a stomach inflammation, according to the spokespeople of the IDF and the hospital. But the uneasy stomach rumblings throughout the country are a sign that something is very wrong in the way that this war is being conducted.

After three weeks of bombings and light ground probes, the IDF and the government have finally come to the conclusion that ground forces have to be used in order to put an end to the Lebanese entanglement. What was clear to every officer and NCO in Israel - from those in the standing army and the reserves to those long retired - has finally dawned on the people running this war: It can't be done from afar. And so, a few days away from the deadline, the IDF ground forces are beginning to enter southern Lebanon. Why did we have to waste three precious weeks, during which hundreds of Israelis and Lebanese were killed or wounded, is a question that the Israeli public will raise after this war.

But the acute stomach rumblings are more than just that. For six years, the IDF has had time to put together a contingency plan for dealing with the 15,000 missiles aimed at Israel in southern Lebanon. But, if such a plan exists, nobody seems to be able to figure out how to implement it. This is one of the factors behind the war of generals that seems to be beginning. There have been a growing number of clandestine accusations in the press, insidious "off-the-record remarks" by generals and government ministers. In addition, there is a feeling of unease emanating from the field commanders of the IDF, who are carrying the brunt of the fighting on their shoulders.

Instead of fighting the war, it seems as if the government and army brass are preparing their excuses and covering their tracks in preparation for a committee of inquiry. Israel's leadership today is made up of civilians; even the IDF chief of staff is an air force general. Maybe, during times of war, at least one side of this equation needs to have had the experience of actually  leading soldiers in combat.

The Israeli public's unease is not going to disappear after the war. It has settled in, burying itself in the consciousness of a people that is able to patiently accept 2,500 missiles landing on its homes, terror attacks in its cities, and ludicrous demands by the countries of the world that its reaction should be "meditated."  But the unease is there - it is building up and eventually will emerge with a political vengeance.